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This paper examines the role of competitive shocks in creating opportunities for new firm 
foundings. I argue that the sudden dissolution of rival firms may release resources that create 
opportunities for firm formation, particularly among employees facing impediments to capturing 
value in their current organizations. Analyzing microdata from the legal services industry, I use 
unexpected deaths of solo-practicing attorneys as quasi-exogenous sources of rival dissolution. 
Results indicate that these shocks increase the odds of founding by about 30%, with stronger 
effects among attorneys with weaker social connections or higher competition for promotion. 
The paper thus highlights the role that founders play in reallocating dissolved rivals’ resources 
while demonstrating that founding may be an important outlet for “blocked” employees to 
capture value from opportunities. 
Managerial summary: 
This paper finds that the shutdown and dissolution of a rival organization may spur employees to 
found new firms. As a consequence, managers may find it valuable to pay attention to 
employees’ turnover intentions following the dissolution of a rival. Findings suggest that 
employees who are having trouble advancing in the firm may be the most likely to found a new 
organization when a rival dissolves, so managers may want to focus retention efforts on these 
individuals. To the extent that managers wish to capture customers, employees, and other 
resources that were formerly attached to a dissolved rival, managers may wish to be aware that 
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Introduction 
Researchers who study “spin-out” organizations underscore that individuals often leave 
their current employment to found new firms, in part to exploit new opportunities (Gambardella, 
Ganco & Honoré, 2014). Two stylized findings emerge from this work. First, unexploited 
(technological) opportunities generated within the original employer “push” employees into new 
venture creation (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2004; Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; Klepper & Thompson, 
2010). Second, individuals at the high end of the talent distribution disproportionately pursue 
these opportunities (Campbell et al., 2012; Elfenbein, Hamilton & Zenger, 2010; Groysberg, 
Nanda & Prats, 2009; though see also Åstebro, Chen & Thompson, 2011). However, relatively 
less attention has been paid to 1) whether opportunities arising in the external environment may 
also propel spinout formation, and 2) which employees might experience a greater “pull” from 
these outside opportunities. One such opportunity is the dissolution of a rival firm. Researchers 
emphasize that the dissolution of a rival firm—by unlocking potentially valuable resources, 
including employees, clients, and physical assets—may benefit incumbent firms, allowing them 
to expand and increase profitability (e.g. Knott & Posen, 2005; Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). Do 
these events also create opportunities for individuals to found new firms? If so, which 
individuals pursue these opportunities? Answering these questions will help illuminate the extent 
to which rival dissolutions sow the seeds of new organizations, while also providing theoretical 
microfoundations that link rival dissolutions to employees’ decisions to found new firms.  
In this paper, I posit that existing firms will not completely absorb the opportunities 
presented by rival firm dissolution – rival firm dissolution may also spur firm founding. In 
addition, I argue that individuals who are relatively “stuck” in their jobs will be more likely to 
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found a new firm following a rival’s dissolution. I argue that “stuck” individuals face barriers to 
capturing value (i.e. compensation and/or promotion) in their current firms which reduce the 
opportunity cost of continued engagement with their current employer. These strictures may 
include a lack of social ties to powerful members of the firm (e.g. Blyler & Coff, 2003) or a lack 
of promotion opportunities (e.g. Sørenson & Sharkey, 2014; Kacperczyk & Marx, 2016). 
Individuals facing these barriers may have a higher willingness to pay for a dissolved rival’s 
resources and/or they may be willing to serve a dissolved rival’s clients at lower prices, as 
compared to other players in the industry. Some of the supply-side resources and customers of 
the dissolved firm may flow to these founders, helping to spur their creation of new firms. 
 Testing the above ideas poses significant empirical challenges. Dissolutions are often 
driven by processes (e.g. changes in technology, weakness in industry demand) that also drive 
foundings (e.g. Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Hannan and Freeman, 1977), creating important 
concerns about omitted variable bias. Furthermore, reverse causality is likely to be an issue, 
since foundings might cause dissolutions (e.g. Phillips, 2002). Overcoming these challenges 
requires the detection of a dissolution that occurs for quasi-random reasons. Using microdata 
from the American legal services industry, I am able to identify sixty-one such shocks, by 
stringently focusing on solo-practicing attorneys who die from heart attacks, accidents, and other 
sudden causes (e.g. Azoulay, Graff Ziven & Yang, 2010; Johnson et al., 1985; Oettl, 2012). 
These solo practitioners lack attorney colleagues, so their deaths effectively dissolve their firms, 
creating opportunities for other attorneys to purchase their client files, to hire their employees, to 
obtain their office locations, or to obtain their resources in a more indirect manner, such as by 
securing newly available clients. While some of these opportunities are likely captured by 
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attorneys that stay within existing firms, I focus on whether these opportunities also spur the 
founding of new organizations, and by whom. While the resources released by these deaths are 
not, by themselves, likely enough to justify the founding of a new firm, they might provide a 
boost that, at the margin, makes the formation of a firm worthwhile for certain individuals. 
I find that surviving attorneys who formerly competed with these deceased solo 
practitioners are about 30% more likely than average to found a new organization in the year 
following the death. Consistent with my theoretical expectation, I find that these foundings are 
concentrated among attorneys that face barriers to value capture within their current 
organizations: these include attorneys who share law school affiliations with fewer partners in 
their practice area, and attorneys who face more competition for promotion.  
Additional analyses help link the deceased firms and the newly founded firms. For 
example, I find that firms founded in the wake of a rival solo practitioner’s death survive longer 
than others, suggesting that a rival’s dissolution allows for the creation of more robust startups, 
likely due to the acquisition of resources released by the deceased firm. In addition, while I am 
unable to measure transfers of clients or employees due to lack of data, I document that thirteen 
of the newly founded firms use the former location or contact information of a deceased firm, 
which provides some direct evidence connecting the resources of the deceased firms to those of 
the newly founded firms. I also explore important alternative explanations for the results, such as 
mortality salience, conflicts of client interests, and “inheritance” of clients by friends of the 
deceased attorneys. Expanding beyond the well-identified but relatively rare instances of sudden 
deaths, I also examine whether unexpected disbarments of rival solo attorneys leads to 
foundings, and find similar results. Finally, I discuss how this specialized setting and research 
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design may generalize by providing anecdotal accounts of similar outcomes in other industries. 
The paper makes several contributions. The entrepreneurship literature in strategy 
focuses on the characteristics of individuals and their current employers when describing why 
new firms emerge (e.g. Anton & Yao, 1995; Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; Gambardella et al., 2014; 
Hellmann, 2007; Pakes & Nitzan, 1983). The entrepreneurship literature in organization theory 
places more emphasis on external, industry level factors (e.g. Sine & David, 2003; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). This paper contributes by combining these complementary perspectives, which 
rarely intersect, and making the point that a shock in the external environment produces 
foundings by individuals who cannot easily capture value in their current job. Second, I extend 
existing work that examines who engages in employee entrepreneurship (e.g. Campbell et al., 
2012; Kacperczyk & Marx, 2016; Sørenson & Sharkey, 2014) by documenting that “blocked” 
employees—those with limited social connections and those facing barriers to promotion—are 
an important source of new firm formation, particularly when rival firms dissolve. Finally, the 
paper uses employer-employee linked data and a quasi-exogenous source of dissolution to 
provide the strongest evidence thus far that the dissolution of one firm may lead to the founding 
of other firms (e.g. Aldrich, 1990; Hiatt, Sine & Tolbert 2009, Parachuri & Ingram, 2012; Pe’er 
& Vertinsky, 2008; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983). This valuable empirical contribution has 
applications to other important questions regarding firm dynamics, entrepreneurship, and 
innovation, which I explore in the discussion section. 
Why Might the Dissolution of a Rival Lead to Firm Foundings? 
My primary argument is that the dissolution of a rival may create firm founding 
opportunities for employees working for other organizations. The dissolved rival vacates a 
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customer niche, creating newly underserved demand that might be served by a newly founded 
firm. In addition, it may be easier for founders to obtain the supply-side resources of the 
dissolved rival, such as equipment and other physical capital or intangible assets like brands, 
patents, or client lists, owing to the dissolved firm’s desire to liquidate some or most of its assets. 
Consistent with this idea, prior work shows positive correlations between dissolution 
rates and founding rates at the industry level of analysis (Aldrich, 1990; Hiatt, Sine & Tolbert 
2009, Pe’er & Vertinsky, 2008; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983). Though these authors do not discern 
whether these newly founded firms are helmed by former employees of dissolved organizations 
(who may be engaging in necessity-based self-employment) or employees of competing firms 
who are pursuing opportunities (who are the focus of my theory), they note the possibility that 
reductions in competition for resources may create opportunities for founding. For example, 
Delcroix and Carroll (1983: 278) note that “[t]he death of a newspaper instantaneously creates a 
fund of floating resources such as printing presses, offices, personnel, and even readers. . .these 
resources can be reassembled immediately into new press ventures.”   
Additionally, anecdotes from a variety of industries describe dissolutions that enable 
founders to venture out of their current jobs and form new firms. For example, when the 
iconoclastic owner of Clark Foam, a surfboard manufacturer, suddenly decided to shut down his 
business in 2006, employees from other firms in the industry left their jobs to start new surfboard 
manufacturing firms, motivated by the availability of customers and the ability to purchase 
Clark’s old machinery and hire its former employees (Luna, 2006). The collapse of existing tech 
companies during the dot-com bubble facilitated the entry of new startups by allowing founders 
to obtain technology equipment and other assets, with auction companies matching dissolving 
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firms with founders interested in buying their assets (Irwin, 2001). The dissolution of 
professional services firms like financial advisors (Shidler, 2010), attorneys (Butler & Paszkiet, 
2008), and medical professionals such as doctors and dentists (Alty, 2015) create opportunities 
for founders to purchase client lists of dissolved firms, hire former personnel, or move into office 
locations that were previously occupied by the dissolved rival. Newly created restaurants often 
have their roots in the closure of a rival, which may allow founders to obtain the dissolved firm’s 
location, its equipment, or its other assets (such as liquor licenses) (e.g. Forman, 2008)1.  
  In order to capture these opportunities from a rival’s dissolution, founders must be 
willing and able to provide more value than established firms to a dissolved rival’s customers or 
to the owners of a dissolved firm’s resources. For example, founders might charge lower prices 
to a dissolved rival’s customers and/or founders might pay higher prices to obtain the dissolved 
rival’s resources, as compared to an established firm. Why might founders be willing to do so?    
I argue that an important motivation stems from the difficulty that a founder faces in 
capturing value inside of the current firm. These difficulties might arise from various sources, 
such as a lack of social ties to powerful members of the firm (e.g. Blyler & Coff, 2003) or a 
significant amount of competition for promotion (e.g. Sørenson & Sharkey, 2014).  
Individuals facing these impediments may be willing to charge lower prices to a 
dissolved rival’s customers, in part because these impediments reduce the opportunity cost of 
                                                            
1 It is important to note that many of these industries, as well as those examined by prior authors (e.g. soft drink 
manufacturing in the early 1900s (Hiatt et al., 2009), newspapers in the 1800s (Delacroix & Carroll, 1983)) have  
relatively low entry costs / minimum efficient scale. In industries where entry costs are higher, it may be difficult for 
founders to obtain the capital required to translate a dissolved rival’s resources into a new venture, which may 
weaken the relationship between rival dissolution and founding. I expand on this boundary condition in the 
discussion section. 
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remaining with the current firm. For example, an asset manager whose contract limits his 
residual claimancy might be willing to found his own firm and accept lower fees from the clients 
of a dissolved competitor, compared to what might be charged by his former firm or other extant 
firms in the industry. Individuals facing impediments might also be willing to pay higher prices 
than extant firms for the supply-side resources of a dissolved rival, in order to leave the strictures 
of their current firms. For example, a restaurant manager with limited prospects for promotion 
might be motivated to found a new restaurant to escape these impediments, and she might have a 
higher willingness to pay for a dissolved competitor’s unexpired lease than potential bidders 
from extant firms. As a consequence of these micro-level motivations, some individuals may 
capture the resources of a dissolved rival, and these resources may, at the margin, assist them in 
the formation of a new firm. 
Hypothesis 1:  The dissolution of a rival firm increases the probability that a member of a 
surviving firm founds a new organization. 
 
Who Founds a New Firm When a Rival Dissolves?  The Importance of Organizational 
Barriers to Value Capture 
 
If value capture motivations indeed help to connect the failure of rivals with the founding of new 
firms, we should observe that the positive relationship between rival failure and firm founding is 
more positive for individuals who face more impediments to value capture. I briefly examine two 
distinct impediments which have been noted by prior researchers:  shared educational affiliations 
with powerful members of the firm and competition for promotion.  
 Individuals who lack shared affiliations, such as a degree from the same educational 
institution, to powerful members of the firm likely face higher barriers to value capture (e.g. 
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Blyler & Coff, 2003). Powerful individuals have many reasons to give preferential treatment to 
those with whom they share school ties. For example, educational affiliation is a salient marker 
of personal identity (e.g. Mael & Ashforth, 1992), and a long literature describes why individuals 
may give preference to similar others (e.g. Tajfel, 1982), including those who attended the same 
educational institution (e.g. Bordieau & Passeron, 1977; Cohen, Frazzini & Malloy, 2010). Thus, 
individuals who lack ties to powerful members of the firm may believe that they have weaker 
prospects for advancement and value capture within the organization (e.g. Ishida, Spilerman & 
Su, 1997).  
Competition for promotion also poses an important barrier to value capture within the 
organization. When individuals face more competition, their odds of obtaining a promotion and 
its attendant rewards decrease (e.g. Stewman & Konda, 1983; Sørenson & Sharkey, 2014). As a 
consequence, the value of remaining in the current job may decline. 
 Thus, when a rival dissolves, individuals who face these strictures may be willing to pay 
relatively higher prices for the dissolved rival’s resources, and/or they may be willing to charge 
relatively low prices to a dissolved rival’s customers, given the disadvantage that they perceive 
inside of their current firm. As a consequence, among the set of individuals who are exposed to a 
rival’s dissolution, individuals facing these impediments should be more likely to found a firm.  
Hypothesis 2:  The positive relationship between the dissolution of a rival firm and the 
probability that a member of a surviving firm founds a new organization is stronger for 
(a) members who share fewer educational affiliations with powerful members of the 
organization, and (b) members who face more competition for promotion. 
Data 
I test these hypotheses using microdata from the legal services industry in the United States, 
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covering the period 1999-2012. The legal services industry has hosted prior studies of firm 
foundings (e.g. Campbell et al., 2012; Phillips, 2002) and dissolutions (Rider, 2014; Rider & 
Negro, 2015). My primary data source is an electronic version of the nationwide Martindale 
Hubbell Legal Directory (Martindale), which I link to other data sources. Martindale is often 
referred to as the “white pages for lawyers.” Firms from all geographic and legal specialties have 
an incentive to list themselves and their attorneys in Martindale in order to maintain professional 
contact with other attorneys and to advertise their services to potential clients, who can search 
the database for free. The directory has been in existence for over 140 years and contains rich 
variables on hundreds of thousands of attorneys and tens of thousands of law firms. 
The fundamental unit of analysis in the Martindale data is an attorney-firm-quarter. 
Martindale provides unique, time-stable identifiers for each attorney and law firm. It also 
includes information such as attorney law school, areas of practice/legal specialties (e.g. 
corporate versus family law), and the street address and contact information of an attorney’s 
office. Client relationships are not consistently included in the data. Because quarterly 
observations are not always available for the earliest years of the data, I collapse the data to 
attorney-firm-year observations. In the small number of situations where attorneys are listed in 
multiple firms or multiple offices of a single firm in the same period, I assign the attorney to a 
unique firm and unique office following the procedure described in Parkin & Baker (2006), who 
use similar data. I define an office at the core based statistical area (CBSA, i.e. city) level. 
Sample 
I define a sample of attorneys who are “at risk” of creating a new organization. I define this 
sample as widely as possible. I identify all attorneys working for law firms located in the United 
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States, which results in an initial sample of 3.7 million attorney-year observations. Then I 
implement two restrictions. First, I follow Phillips (2002) and eliminate the 600,000 or so solo 
practitioners from the risk set, because it is difficult to discern whether new firms formed by 
these individuals are, in fact, simply administrative recodes. Second, I require that the attorney 
be located in one of the US’s 929 core-based statistical areas, since these are the geographical 
units that I use to define the boundaries of law firm competition. This drops 370,000 rural 
attorneys from the sample. Finally, I exclude attorneys who work for organizations that fail in 
the current year (results are unchanged by their inclusion) and who have missing data on date of 
birth, law school affiliation, and legal specialty. The final sample contains 2.7M attorney-years. 
Dependent Variable 
Founds new firm – This dichotomous variable takes a value of one when the attorney founds a 
new law firm in the following year, which effectively lags all independent variables by one year 
and ensures an appropriate time-ordering. I follow Phillips (2002) in identifying founding events 
in the Martindale data. First, the attorney must appear in a newly created law firm within three 
years of her exit from the current law firm without appearing in another organization. The time 
lag accounts for situations where founders may not list themselves in Martindale immediately. 
Second, the attorney must be a “name partner,” meaning that her last name must appear in the 
name of the law firm in the firm’s first appearance in the data. Non-founders who work for the 
firm in its first year are not included in the measure.  
I scrub recodes and mergers from this measure with two steps. First, I use flows of 
employees, identifying recodes and mergers when a firm’s ID disappears from the data and more 
than 50% of the firm’s employees appear again in the following year, working for the same 
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organization. These events are likely to be recodes or mergers, rather than startup formations 
(Campbell, 2005). Second, I place a 25 attorney cap on the size of a new firm to further ensure 
that I am not counting recodes or mergers as new organizations. Results are robust to other size 
caps, such as one, two, three, ten, or 50 attorneys (see Table B.1 of the online appendix). This 
leaves me with 13,857 named founders of 11,371 unique startups. The median number of 
attorneys in the first year of each new firm is one, with a mean of 2.1 and a standard deviation of 
1.8.  
Explanatory variables  
Dissolution of a competitor firm – If a researcher wanted to design an ideal experiment for 
investigating the effect of rival dissolution on founding, she would randomly assign some firms 
to dissolve and then observe the founding behavior of individuals working for competing 
organizations. To approximate this ideal, I focus on unexpected deaths of solo practicing 
attorneys. This research design allows me to avoid important alternative explanations that might 
plague other approaches to studying the effect of rival failures on foundings. For example, an 
unobserved factor, such as weakness in the economic environment, might cause the dissolution 
of rival firms while also forcing other individuals in the industry into necessity-based self-
employment. Or, quite differently, an unobserved shift in consumer tastes or technology might 
cause the dissolution of rivals while creating opportunities for founders. These deaths create a 
source of rival dissolution that should be unrelated to conditions in the economic environment.  
My focus on solo practitioners is purposeful: if a larger firm dissolves shortly after an 
attorney passes away, there is an unobserved reason why that firm chose to dissolve rather than 
continue, and I want to prevent these unobservables (such as weakness in the environment) from 
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affecting my analyses. As a robustness test, I also examine disbarments of solo practicing 
attorneys, where competitors are required to cease practicing law due to ethical violations. 
 I identify deaths in two ways. First, I obtain from Martindale a list of attorneys in the 
directory who Martindale knows to have died from 1998-2012. In order to keep its directory 
current, Martindale periodically cross-checked its database with the Death Master File provided 
by the Social Security Administration. I obtain exact date of death and cause of death 
information by searching for these individuals by name and location in ObituaryData.com, which 
compiles obituary information from thousands of newspapers around the United States into a 
searchable database.  Second, I identify other deaths of attorneys by searching ObituaryData.com 
for terms such as “attorney”, “partner in the law firm.” I link this second set of individuals to 
Martindale data using name, location, and other information listed in the obituary. I define deaths 
as unexpected if the person 1) is under the age of 65 and 2) the obituary describes the person’s 
death as sudden or unexpected, such as from a heart attack, accident, or sudden illness. I exclude 
suicides. I am able to identify the deaths of 1,078 individuals who appear as partner attorneys in 
the Martindale data in the year prior to their deaths. Of these, I am able to classify 365 (34%) as 
unexpected via cause of death information in the obituary. This ratio comports well with prior 
research, such as Azoulay et al. (2010), who find a 45% rate among 248 superstar scientists; Shi, 
Hoskisson & Zhang (2016), who find a 24% rate among 296 corporate directors; and Nguyen & 
Neilson (2010), who find a 30% rate among 772 corporate directors. These samples are likely to 
be demographically similar to partner attorneys, giving me confidence that the data are 
appropriate. Of the 365 unexpected deaths of partners, 61 are solo practitioners. See Table 2 for a 
breakdown of the partner attorneys who suffer unexpected deaths. 
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 I define solo practitioners as those attorneys who are the only individuals affiliated with 
their firm in the Martindale data. Rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly takes a value of one 
when a solo practitioner who competes in the same CBSA and legal specialty as the focal 
attorney dies unexpectedly in the current year (see Online Appendix A for details on specialties).   
 A few potential pathways might lead an attorney to found a new law firm following the 
unexpected death of a rival solo practitioner. The founder might engage in a direct transaction 
with the estate of the deceased person, paying a fee to acquire client files, an unexpired lease, or 
the telephone number of the firm (e.g. Geraghty, 2007). Indirect pathways may also be 
important. Founders may secure a deceased person’s clients without directly compensating the 
deceased person’s estate. Founders might also hire personnel, such as assistants or paralegals, 
who previously worked for the deceased person, not only for the employees’ general skills, but 
also as a conduit for their knowledge about potential clients (e.g. Somaya et al., 2008). It is 
important to emphasize that these deaths may not, by themselves, release enough resources to 
justify the founding of a new firm. Instead, they might be best viewed as providing, at the 
margin, a boost to an individual who is considering forming a new firm. 
Shared educational affiliations with powerful members of the firm (H2a): The law school 
that an attorney attends has been used extensively in prior research as a marker of shared 
educational affiliation (e.g. Rider, 2014). I follow this existing work, and I measure shared 
educational affiliations by calculating the percentage of partners in the attorney’s office and 
legal specialty who obtain their law degree from the same law school as the focal attorney. 
Because these partners work closely with the focal attorney, they are the individuals who are 
most likely to affect her promotion and compensation.  
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Competition for promotion (H2b). Associates, the junior members of law firms, compete 
with each other for promotion into the firm’s partnership. A common measure of the intensity of 
this competition is the firm’s ratio of associates to partners (e.g. Galanter & Palay, 1991), often 
referred to as a law firm’s “leverage ratio”. Similar to the law school ties measure, I calculate 
this variable using associates and partners who share the same office and legal specialty as the 
focal attorney. While associates can be promoted without the departure of an existing partner, 
this ratio provides a reasonable approximation of the average number of competitors vying for a 
given promotion opportunity (Bidwell & Keller, 2014; Sørenson & Sharkey, 2014; Stewman & 
Konda, 1983). While partners also compete with each other to advance to higher levels of the 
partnership (e.g. from non-equity to equity partner), I am unable to observe these gradations in 
the Martindale data, so my analyses for H2b focus only on associates. 
Control variables 
Individual level. I control for age, experience, and tenure using date of birth, date of 
graduation from law school, and date joined the current firm (left censored), respectively. A 
dummy indicates whether the attorney is an associate. I measure gender using the gender 
typicality of an attorney’s first name, according the US Social Security Administration (SSA)2 
and the database maintained by GenderChecker.com. I create dummies for male and female. I 
control for legal specialty with a set of 26 dummies for each of the legal specialties identified in 
Appendix A. I also account for an attorney’s overlap with his colleagues in terms of legal 
specialty. I calculate legal specialty overlap with coworkers by first constructing a 26-dimension 
vector for each lawyer and for each law firm, which allows me to define the position of each 
                                                            
2 http://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/limits.html 
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attorney and each law firm in “legal specialty” space. I then create the overlap measure by taking 
the cosine of the angle between the attorney’s vector and the employer’s vector.3   
I control for attorney quality in three major ways. First, I link self-reported law school 
affiliation to the rankings provided by US News and World Report (USNWR) for the pre-sample 
years of 1994-1998. USNWR ranks law schools from 1-50 during this period, and I create five 
dummies that indicate the quintile of the average ranking of the attorney’s law school during this 
period. 4 The excluded group includes unranked schools. Second, Martindale contains short 
biographies where attorneys can list law school accomplishments. I include indicators of whether 
attorneys report that they 1) earned membership in Order of the Coif, a prestigious law school 
honor society open to no more than 10% of graduates, 2) participated as an editor of a law 
review, 3) participated in moot court, an exclusive club where students practice litigation 
proceedings, 4) served as a law clerk for a judge, or 5) earned Phi Beta Kappa as an 
undergraduate. Other work using the same data (Carnahan & Greenwood, 2017) show that these 
variables strongly predict attorney promotion, suggesting that they are valuable markers of 
attorney quality. Third, Martindale surveys attorneys and asks them to rate the quality of their 
peers in other firms on a scale of A, B, and C. These ratings are important markers of quality that 
are often displayed prominently on attorney websites. I include a dummy for each of these 
attorney peer ratings to help capture time-varying attorney quality. In robustness tests, I use 
                                                            
3 If Ai and Fj represent the vectors for attorney i and law firm j, legal specialty overlap would be computed as: Ai Ï  
Fj/|Ai||Fj|, meaning that I use the dot product to compute the angle between the vectors.  
4 USNWR rankings began in 1987. I commence my measurement in 1994 because this is the first year that the 
rankings included at least 50 schools.  The top of the rankings are stable over time, with only 18 schools ever to 
receive a top 15 ranking by USNWR from 1987-2016.  
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attorney and law school cohort fixed effects to control for stable differences in attorney quality 
and time-varying differences in law school quality.  
Firm-level controls. I control for firm size and office as % of total firm size using attorney 
headcount. I control for firm performance using growth in headcount, calculated as (firm sizet – 
firm sizet-1 ). I also measure whether the firm is acquired, calculated when the firm exits the data 
and more 50% of the firm’s attorneys appear in the same firm in the next year. My primary 
analyses include office fixed effects, which control for time-stable differences across each legal 
establishment in the data. Offices are defined by the intersection of law firm and city, so this 
fixed effect also captures time-stable differences in geography. 
Rival controls. I account for the density of competition in the local legal market with # of 
rival firms, which consists of the number of firms who share the attorney’s CBSA and at least 
one of her legal specialties. I include % of rival firms that are solo practices to account for the 
baseline probability that the focal attorney will be exposed to the death of a solo practitioner in 
the current year. To account for local economic conditions and compare death-related failures to 
other failures, I control for Rival closures, solo practices and Rival closures, firm size>1. I 
identify these failures when a rival firm stops listing in the Martindale directory, scrubbing 
recodes and mergers using the process noted above. Rival partner dies unexpectedly, firm size>1 
is the number of unexpected deaths of non-solo practicing partner attorneys who work in the 
same CBSA as the focal attorney (but not the same firm) and share at least one legal specialty 
with the focal attorney. Year dummies are also included in the analysis.  
Estimation 
Founding a new firm is a dichotomous outcome. In the results that follow, I primarily estimate 
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linear probability models due to the ease of interpreting coefficients and interaction terms. All 
results displayed are unchanged when using logit models. I also ensure that results are robust to a 
penalized logit model that adjusts for rare events (Allison, 2012). Because the death of a solo 
practitioner “treats” many attorneys in the same CBSA (city), I cluster standard errors by CBSA 
to account for dependence across observations. I also incorporate block-bootstrapping methods 
which allow for correlation in standard errors within a CBSA. 
Results 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics. 0.5% of attorneys found a new firm in a given year. 
Carnahan, Agarwal & Campbell (2012) use US Census data from the legal services industry and 
show a 1% startup rate. Their definition of firm founder is broader than the one used here (they 
include all employees of a law firm in its first year, while I examine only named partners), so this 
.5% rate is consistent and gives confidence in the ability of the Martindale data to capture startup 
events. We see that about 1% of attorneys in the sample are “treated” by the unexpected death of 
a rival solo practitioner.  18% of the partners in an attorney’s practice area attended the 
attorney’s law school. The average attorney works in a practice area with about .5 associates per 
partner.  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
Table 1 shows that solo practitioners are often lower-status individuals  - they are less 
likely to have attended a top law school, to have earned law school honors, or to have a high peer 
reputation. This comports with expectation, as some solo practitioners may work alone due to a 
lack of other employment options. Table 1 shows a more complex picture with firm founders. 
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They have higher peer ratings than other attorneys, but they are also less likely to have attended a 
top law school. This comports with expectation, as founders often come from the tails of the 
talent distribution (e.g. Åstebro et al., 2011). Individuals who pursue a high status law degree 
may also have weaker tolerance for the uncertainty inherent in self-employment. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics on partner attorneys who die unexpectedly. Each of 
the  61 deaths of solo practitioners “treats,” on average, 475 attorneys in the estimation sample5. 
These solo practitioners have an average age of 54 at time of death, and they are mostly male.  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
 Table 3 provides cross sectional correlations. This table shows the correlation between 
the treatment variable, rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly, and the other covariates. The 
only variable with a correlation above .07 is % of rival firms that are solo practices (correlation 
of .12). This relationship is intuitive; each variable will increase as the focal attorney works in a 
city and legal specialty with more solo practitioners. The overall lack of correlation between the 
treatment variable and other covariates provides some indication of its quasi-random assignment.  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
 Table 4 provides an initial test of Hypothesis 1 by comparing unconditional founding 
rates of treated and non-treated attorneys. The probability that an individual founds a new firm in 
the year after experiencing the death of a rival solo practitioner is about .9%, as compared to .5% 
for the overall sample. This 80% increase from the sample mean (i.e. (.90-.50)/.50) is 
                                                            
5 (e.g. 2.7M sample * .01 receiving treatment / 61 deaths) 
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economically significant and has a p-value of 0.001.  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
Table 5 tests H1, H2a, and H2b.  P-values are displayed in parentheses. Model 1 provides 
a simple regression with the treatment variable and no covariates. The .004 marginal increase in 
the probability that an individual founds a new firm is similar in size to the result in Table 4. 
Model 2 adds the full suite of control variables, including office fixed effects, year dummies, 
legal specialty dummies, and the variables listed in Table 1. Results imply a .0019  increase in 
founding probability for the treatment group. Using the baseline rate of founding of .005 as a 
starting point, this effect size suggests that the 61 deaths lead to 49 more founders6 than we 
might have otherwise expected if the deaths had not occurred7. Marginal effects of control 
variables comport with prior literature. Male attorneys, less experienced attorneys, attorneys with 
shorter tenure, attorneys in smaller firms, and attorneys with high peer ratings are more likely to 
found. Law school ties to partners in the law office reduce the odds of starting a new firm, as 
does being an associate or attending a top law school.  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
---------------------------- 
FIGURE 1, FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                            
6 26,197 attorneys are treated by these deaths. If these individuals formed firms at the rate of the rest of the sample, 
we would expect 26,197*.005 = 131 founders. Instead, we see 26,197*(.005+.0019) = 180 founders. 180-131= 49.  
7 It is important to note that this figure may not necessarily suggest that 49/61=80% of the demand formerly served 
by the deceased individuals flow to newly founded firms. Interviews and background research suggest that the 
clients of deceased individuals often scatter to multiple surviving attorneys; even when attorneys purchase a 
deceased person’s practice outright, they often do not successfully retain many clients (e,g, Brill, 2011). It is a key 
limitation that I lack client data and cannot assess the extent to which the demand formerly served by the deceased 
person is captured by extant firms versus startups, and I discuss this limitation in the discussion section. 
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 Table 5, Model 3 tests H2a. I add an interaction of the treatment variable with the 
percentage of partners in the focal attorney’s practice area who attended the same law school as 
the focal attorney. The interaction term is negative and with p-value=.000. Figure 1 allows for an 
interpretation of the economic significance of H2a. We see that when an attorney has no law 
school ties to a partner in her practice area, the marginal effect of treatment is about .003. The 
marginal effect of treatment declines to zero if the attorney has law school ties to at least 40% of 
partners in the practice area. These values are well represented in the data (mean=.18, SD=.28) 
and suggest an economically important effect size. H2a receives strong support in the data. 
Model 4 tests H2b. The sample is limited to associates, since these are the only 
individuals for whom I can measure competition for promotion. We see that the interaction 
between the treatment variable and the ratio of associates to partners in the attorneys’ office 
(which capture competition for promotion) is positive with p-value=.000, implying that 
associates who face more competition for promotion are more likely to found a firm when a rival 
solo practitioner dies unexpectedly. Figure 2 allows for an interpretation of effect size. When the 
associate-partner ratio increases from the sample mean of .56 to the mean +1 SD (SD=.74), the 
treatment effect increases by .002, which is 40% of the sample mean. H2b receives support. 
Model 5 includes the interactions for H2a and H2b in the same model and results are unchanged. 
Model 6 replaces office fixed effects with attorney fixed effects, and results are unchanged. 
Robustness tests 
Please see Table 7 for a summary of robustness tests and additional analyses. 
Pre-treatment trends. An important assumption underlying the previous analysis is that 
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there is no pre-treatment difference in the probability that treated attorneys and non-treated 
attorneys found new firms (e.g. Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). The longitudinal nature 
of the data allows me to explicitly test this assumption. I estimate the following equation: 
(1) Pr(𝑌𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + � β𝑘𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑘5
𝑘=−5
+ 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
EverTreatedi is a dummy that takes a value of one if the attorney ever experiences the death of a 
rival solo practitioner during the sample period, providing the treated observations with their 
own intercept in the model. I am interested in the ² k coefficients, which measure the change in 
firm founding probability in the years preceding and following the death of a rival solo 
practitioner, relative to the baseline difference established by EverTreatedi. Controlsit are the full 
set of controls indicated in Table 5, Model 2, including office fixed effects and dummies for year 
and legal specialty.  For attorneys who are treated multiple times, I focus on the first treatment. 
Figure 3 presents the estimates of the ² k coefficients as well as the ² iEverTreatedi 
coefficient (represented by the coefficient labeled “Baseline”). I exclude the ² k dummy that 
corresponds to the year of the death, in order to allow the EverTreatedi  dummy to establish the 
baseline difference between the treatment and control groups in that year. Treated attorneys do 
not statistically differ in their probability of forming a new firm, except in the year immediately 
following the solo practitioner’s death. The effect size indicates a .0018 marginal increase in the 
probability of founding, similar in size to the results above. These results provide additional 
confidence in the quasi-random assignment of the death of solo practitioners.  
---------------------------- 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Initial size of startup firms – An important empirical choice made in the prior analyses is 
to place a cap of 25 attorneys on the size of newly founded firms. I explore the implications of 
this choice in Table B.1 (online appendix), where I estimate models which limit the initial size of 
the startup to one, two, or three attorneys. Results are consistent across these models. 
Correlation in standard errors – The death of a single solo practitioner treats many 
attorneys in the same city (i.e. CBSA), raising concerns about correlation in the standard errors 
among attorneys in the same city. Model 5 of Table B.1 replicates results with standard errors 
which are calculated with the more conservative block bootstrapping approach, which allows for 
correlation in the standard errors of observations in the same city, and we see consistent results. 
Use of linear probability model – Foundings are a dichotomous outcome. All results 
displayed in the paper are robust to using logit estimation; I display results for H2a in Model 6 of 
Table B.1. Estimates are the same when using a Firth logit model, which Allison (2012) 
recommends for the examination of rare events. This is expected given the large number of 
foundings in the sample (i.e. founding is not rare from an event-count perspective).  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
Deaths are idiosyncratic – While sudden deaths provide an empirically convenient 
source of competitor dissolution, they are uncommon and perhaps difficult to generalize. To 
increase the robustness of results, I also examine a different type of competitor dissolution: solo 
practitioners who are disbarred. Malfeasance is arguably a more generalizable reason for firm 
dissolution than death. Table B.2 displays results and provides more details. Rivals to disbarred 
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individuals have an increase in founding which is about half the effect size that we observed for 
sudden death, supporting H1 (p=.034). H2a and H2b are not supported. 
Alternative explanations 
Mortality salience - The death of a rival attorney could cause other attorneys to re-
examine their lives (e.g. Carnahan, Kryscynski & Olson, 2017) and might lead attorneys to found 
new firms in order to increase flexibility and spend time with family. If this effect drives the 
results, unexpected deaths of partner attorneys in all firm sizes, not just solo practitioners, should 
increase the probability of new firm founding. These deaths are equally tragic but do not create a 
founding opportunity in the same way as the death of a solo practitioner, since colleagues are 
present to inherit a deceased attorney’s client matters. In Table 5, the coefficient on Rival partner 
dies unexpectedly, firm size>1 is not statistically different from zero; and a Wald test confirms 
that it is different from the treatment effect at p=.04.  
Preference for autonomy – Individuals with a preference to “be their own boss” may find 
that a rival’s dissolution provides them with a long-awaited opening to found their own firm. I 
lack a measure that allows me to capture this type of variation. However, the analyses in Table 5, 
Model 6, which use individual fixed effects, should absorb stable preferences for autonomy. In 
addition, this explanation cannot easily explain the interaction effects for H2a-b, which provides 
additional confidence that autonomy preferences do not fully explain the results. 
Foundings by friends who wind down the deceased person’s practice - Bar associations 
encourage attorneys to make arrangements with a “back-up” attorney to close and wind down 
their firm in the event of their death (e.g. Brill, 2011). Often attorneys do not make such 
arrangements, and attorneys in the community volunteer or are appointed to wind down a 
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deceased practice (e.g. Maskaleris & Cooperman, 1997). It is possible that attorneys involved in 
a wind-down might use new client contacts to start a new firm. These individuals shoulder the 
uncertainty of founding, but this idiosyncratic process might limit generalizability. 
Articles in legal journals and interviews, both with attorneys who have wound down 
practices of deceased solo practitioners as well as with members of state bar associations who 
have overseen such wind-downs, suggest that these back-up attorneys are often friends of the 
deceased (e.g. Berson, 2013). To evaluate this “inheritance” explanation empirically, in Table 
B.2, I examine whether demographic similarity (which increases the odds of friendship) between 
a deceased and treated individual helps to predict founding. I examine overlap in law school, 
gender, age, and prior employment. I do not find evidence that demographically similar 
individuals are more likely to found firms. These patterns conform with anecdotal accounts, 
which note that “backup” attorneys are often other solo practitioners. These individuals are not 
included in the set of potential founders (see “Sample” above), so they do not affect the results. 
Attorney quality - A possible alternative explanation is that attorneys who are impeded in 
their jobs are simply lower quality and that the opportunity provided by a solo practitioner’s 
death is only attractive to lower quality attorneys. In the prior analyses, I include numerous 
controls for attorney quality and also provide results using office fixed effects and individual 
fixed effects to help account for this possibility. I also push further on this idea in Table 6, where 
I interact the treatment variable with various measures of attorney quality. I use law school rank 
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(both dichotomous and continuous) for the full sample, law school honor society membership8 
for associates (since a quality signal from law school may be less germane to senior attorneys), 
and peer ratings for partners (since most associates do not yet have peer ratings). Each of these 
interactions is imprecisely estimated, with large p-values. However, it is important to emphasize 
that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, so differences in attorney quality may still 
be responsible for some of the patterns observed. 
Conflicts of interest - Attorneys in the same firm cannot serve clients with competing 
legal interests, so it is possible that an attorney may start a new firm following the death of a 
rival in order to serve the deceased rival’s clients while avoiding conflicts of interest with his 
current employer. While these attorneys still shoulder the uncertainty of firm founding, this type 
of behavior is idiosyncratic to legal services and also threatens generalizability. Conflicts of 
interest are likely to be salient for attorneys who practice in the same specialties as many of their 
colleagues, since they are likely to have clients with overlapping legal matters. In Table 6, Model 
5, I interact the treatment variable with legal specialty overlap with coworkers. The interaction 
and associated log likelihood tests have very large p-values, which provides some confidence 
that conflicts of interest do not drive the results. Martindale lacks client data.  
Results are spurious – The previous results do not show direct evidence of a connection 
between the deceased attorneys and the newly founded firms. To address this issue, first, I 
examine variation in the competitive overlap between the deceased attorney and the treated 
attorney. Individuals who have more competitive overlap will be better positioned to capitalize 
                                                            
8 Results using the other law school related measures of quality, including law review, judicial clerkship, moot court, 
and Phi Beta Kappa (which is an undergraduate honor) show similar results. I use honor society membership here 
because it has the strongest correlation with the odds that an associate is promoted to partner. 
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on any opportunity created by the death. I split the treatment effect into attorneys who share one 
and more than one legal specialty with the deceased (Table 6, Model 6).  The increase in the 
probability of founding is .0031 for the individuals with overlap in multiple areas, while it is 
.0017 for individuals with overlap in one area (p value of difference =.204). Second, I examine 
the addresses and telephone numbers of newly founded firms, and I compare them to those of the 
deceased individuals. This is the best marker of resource transfer that I have available, as client 
information is not available. I find that twelve newly founded firms occupy the exact address of a 
deceased attorney (including suite number), and one newly founded firm lists the exact same 
telephone number as a deceased attorney. This provides some prima facia evidence that founders 
utilize the resources of the deceased individuals9.  
Performance of startup firms - To further pursue the concern that results are spurious, I 
examine the performance of firms founded by attorneys “treated” by a solo practitioner’s death. I 
measure performance using survival and firm growth (headcount). To the extent that treated 
startups outperform others, this provides some evidence of a connection between the deceased 
firms and the startup firms (e.g. resources released by the deceased firm provide treated startups 
with some manner of advantage). Table B.3 of the online appendix displays results and provides 
more information. I find that “treated” founders survive longer than others. This result helps 
tighten the causal linkage between the deceased firms and the newly founded firms. Better 
survival among treated founders might suggest that they are pursuing opportunities, though 
                                                            
9 I searched Lexis Nexis, Proquest, and Google for notices of sales or client transfers from the deceased individuals 
to individuals in the sample, but I did not find any such notices for the deaths in my sample. This comports with 
expectation, as Brill (2011) notes that buyers of legal practices often contact clients individually, in order to ensure 
continued business, and many state laws require sellers of legal practices to inform clients via certified mail. 
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survival is an imperfect measure of startup performance (Gimeno et al., 1997). 
---------------------------- 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------ 
Discussion 
I examine whether dissolutions of rival firms create opportunities for individuals to found new 
organizations. In order to minimize concerns with reverse causality and omitted variable bias, I 
focus on a special class of firm dissolutions:  unexpected deaths of solo practicing attorneys. I 
find that the probability of an attorney founding a new law firm increase by about 30% from the 
base rate upon the unexpected death of a rival solo practitioner, with rivals defined by city and 
legal specialty. These founders tend to be attorneys who share law school affiliation with few 
partners in their firms and attorneys who faced more competition for promotion in their prior 
firms. My primary interpretation of these results (along with numerous additional analyses) is 
that rival failures are most likely to encourage founding among individuals who face 
impediments inside of their current organizations. These founders might directly purchase assets 
of a deceased individual, or they might obtain newly available resources in a more indirect 
manner, such as by securing newly available clients. While I lack data on clients, I provide other 
evidence that suggests that resources flow from the deceased person to the newly founded firms. 
For example, I find that founders who were “treated” by the unexpected death prior to entry 
survive longer than other startups, and I find thirteen instances where a newly founded firm lists 
the same address or telephone number formerly held by a deceased firm.  
Contributions and future work 
The paper makes contributions that have the potential to simulate novel research in the employee 
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entrepreneurship literature and in the firm dynamics literature. First, I unite and extend two 
complementary literatures that rarely intersect: the employee entrepreneurship literature 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Anton & Yao, 1995; Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; Gambardella et al., 2014; 
Hellmann, 2007; Klepper & Thompson, 2010), and the literature that examines how the external 
environment creates opportunities for firm formation (e.g. Sine & David, 2007; Hiatt et al., 
2009). The employee entrepreneurship literature closely examines the individual and 
organizational mechanisms that lead employees to turn opportunities into newly founded firms, 
but it largely focuses on internal innovations as the source of firm formation opportunities, 
neglecting the external environment. It is also largely theoretical due to the difficulty of 
measuring opportunities, particularly those which are not exploited (see Gambardella et al., 2014 
for an exception). The literature which examines how the external environment may create 
opportunities for firm formation lacks a detailed consideration of the prior employment of 
individuals who form new firms, so it does not often explain why founders may find 
entrepreneurship more attractive than their current jobs. This paper shows the promise of 
combining both perspectives. I build and test theory which describes how firm formation 
emerges from the interaction between external opportunities and the characteristics of an 
employee’s current job. I focus on the interaction between rival dissolutions and organizational 
barriers to value capture, and future work can explore how newly founded firms emerge from the 
combination of other external shocks (e.g. changes in technology or regulation) and other 
employee and organizational characteristics. 
Second, the paper makes a further contribution to the employee entrepreneurship 
literature by showing how organizational barriers to value capture, such as shared social ties and 
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competition for promotion, play a critical role in determining whether employees will pursue an 
opportunity via the founding of a new firm. Prior work in this vein emphasizes the parent firm’s 
strategy (e.g. Cassiman & Ueda, 2006; Hellmann & Perotti, 2011; Klepper & Thompson, 2010) 
and resources (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2004; Kacperczyk, 2012), or the characteristics of the 
technology underlying the opportunity (e.g. Gambardella et al., 2014; Ganco, 2012) as important 
determinants of whether an individual will remain in the firm or pursue an opportunity by 
founding a new organization. This paper suggests that social ties and competition for promotion 
matter because they alter the opportunity costs of remaining with the firm.  
The results for H2a (law school ties to partners) also contribute to the nascent literature 
examining how employees’ social ties influence their entrepreneurship decisions (e.g. Nanda & 
Sørenson, 2010). I find that social ties help tether the employee to the firm when an opportunity 
arrives quasi-exogenously from outside the organization. However, in other situations, social ties 
might serve as the source for valuable ideas that could be exploited inside of a new firm (e.g. 
Hansen, 1999), perhaps leading to higher rates of founding for well-connected individuals. 
Exploring this tension and delineating the circumstances under which social ties increase versus 
decrease founding is a valuable opportunity that is highlighted by the current manuscript.  
The results examining social ties and competition for promotion also provide an 
important complement to a different stream of work in employee entrepreneurship, which 
emphasizes that founders often consist of “star” employees who seek a vehicle to earn returns 
from sizeable opportunities (e.g. Groysberg et al., 2009; Campbell et al. 2012; Elfenbein et al., 
2012) or of “misfits” who enter self-employment because they have no other employment 
options (e.g. Åstebro et al., 2011). The theory and results presented here suggest a middle 
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ground:  founding is also important for employees who may or may not be stars but do face 
obstacles to advancement in their current jobs. Founding a new firm may allow them to earn 
returns from relatively modest opportunities (in this case, the dissolution of a small rival firm). 
Combining these ideas suggests an underlying assortative matching process, where star 
employees may found firms primarily to pursue larger opportunities, while other employees 
found firms to pursue smaller opportunities that are ignored by stars. Future work that models 
this process directly could make an important contribution (see Mindruta, Moeen & Agarwal, 
2016). 
Finally, the paper makes an important empirical contribution to the broad-based research 
stream that examines the relationship between dissolution of one firm and the birth of others (e.g. 
Agarwal & Gort, 1996; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Hiatt et al., 2009; Pe’er & Vertinsky, 2008; 
see also Parachuri & Ingram, 2012). While prior work finds positive correlations between 
dissolutions and foundings at the industry level, prior work has not used employee-employer 
linked microdata, nor has it examined quasi-exogenous dissolutions. As a consequence, necessity 
based entrepreneurship, whereby former employees of dissolved firms start new organizations 
because they have lack employment options, creates a strong alternative explanation for prior 
results. I am able to set aside this critical alternative explanation for the first time, providing 
some of the strongest evidence so far that dissolutions lead to foundings.  
The research design used here may inspire future work that uses quasi-exogenous 
dissolutions to examine other important research questions involving firm dynamics, 
entrepreneurship, and innovation. For example, reports suggest that the sudden dissolution of 
Clark Foam, the surfboard manufacturer mentioned above, provoked a wave of innovation in the 
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industry because new entrants used Clark’s resources to engage in experimentation (Housman, 
2015) and that the closure of NASA facilities spurred innovation as former NASA employees 
moved into other sectors (Kharif, 2012). Research that rigorously examines these types of 
shocks, perhaps using qualitative methods, may deliver unanticipated, novel insights.  
Other exciting research questions come into focus when we consider that the resources 
released by a rival’s dissolution could be captured by incumbent firms as well as by employee 
entrepreneurs. Which resources are captured by incumbents and which resources are captured by 
employee entrepreneurs?  Do incumbents and employee entrepreneurs use dissolved firms’ 
resources for different purposes? These questions follow naturally from the theory and results 
presented here, and answering them will help us better understand the differing roles played by 
incumbent firms and startups in the process of resource reallocation and creative destruction.  
Limitations  
 Despite these contributions, the paper has important limitations. The first is 
generalizability. While the theory presented here should extend to other contexts, the effect that 
rival dissolution has on founding may be larger in legal services than in other settings. Legal 
services has low barriers to entry for individuals who are already licensed members of the 
industry (e.g. low minimum efficient scale, absence of covenants-not-to-compete [Starr, 
Balasubramanian & Sakakibara, 2016]), making it easier for founders to compete with 
incumbents for a dissolved firm’s resources. Conflicts of interest, a friction specific to the legal 
services industry, may also cause the hypothesized effects to be larger in this setting than others.  
Focusing on deaths of solo practitioners has important tradeoffs. This choice provides 
empirical clarity, because these dissolutions have a clear cause and a clear timing, and should not 
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be driven by factors that also correlate with foundings. However, the number of these events is 
relatively small. While I also examine disbarments to ensure the robustness of my results, the 
scale required to pursue the opportunities created by deaths and disbarments is small, making it 
possible for firm founders to compete for them at relative parity with existing firms. In settings 
where the pursuit of opportunities requires larger scale, existing firms may absorb more of the 
opportunities that are created when a rival dissolves. Furthermore, we might also see weaker 
results for H2a-b if we examined other types of dissolutions. Deaths of solo practitioners may 
create relative modest opportunities. If opportunities are more sizeable, employees who do not 
face large impediments in their jobs may also be attracted to them.  
Another limitation stems from the non-random assignment of my measures of 
impediments to value capture (H2a-b). Attorneys who have fewer law school ties to partners in 
their practice area and more competition for promotion may vary on other important dimensions, 
such as skills and quality. I take numerous steps to address alternative explanations that might 
arise from this endogeneity (i.e. many controls for attorney quality, use of individual and office 
fixed effects), but readers should interpret these results with the appropriate level of caution. 
Finally, I am unable to track the clients of the deceased and newly founded firms. While I 
find that thirteen startups occupy the former address or use the former telephone number of 
deceased individuals, indicating that the resources of deceased firms are used in founding, 
tracking clients would enhance my ability to connect deaths and subsequent founding events. I 
am also unable to discern the precise channel by which founders acquire the resources of the 
deceased attorney, e.g. via direct payments to the deceased person’s estates. Future work that is 
able to track resources of dissolved firms at a more granular level will make an important 
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contribution to our understanding of the resource reallocation process. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics:  
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
 Full Estimation Sample Founds New Firm Does Not Found New Firm All Solo Practitioners        
 n Mean StDev n Mean StDev n Mean StDev n Mean StDev 
DV:  Founds new firm 2746500 0.005 0.071 13857 1.000 0.000 2732643 0.000 0.000 617071 N/A 0.034 
H1: Rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly 2746500 0.010 0.097 13857 0.018 0.133 2732643 0.010 0.097 617071 0.015 0.122 
H2a: % of partners in practice area from attorney's law school 2746500 0.183 0.283 13857 0.190 0.297 2732643 0.183 0.283 617071 N/A 0.000 
H2b: Associate-partner ratio in practice area 2746500 0.559 0.749 13857 0.520 0.716 2732643 0.559 0.749 617071 N/A 0.197 
Associate 2746500 0.240 0.427 13857 0.222 0.416 2732643 0.240 0.427 617071 N/A 0.043 
Attorney age 2746500 46.347 11.558 13857 45.693 10.098 2732643 46.351 11.564 605472 52.885 10.423 
Years since law school graduation 2746500 19.371 11.787 13857 18.449 10.272 2732643 19.376 11.794 615797 24.487 10.840 
Tenure with firm 2746500 4.912 3.613 13857 4.718 3.559 2732643 4.913 3.613 617071 3.229 3.073 
Tenure with firm is left-censored 2746500 0.479 0.500 13857 0.395 0.489 2732643 0.480 0.500 617071 0.160 0.366 
Partner 2746500 0.690 0.462 13857 0.684 0.465 2732643 0.690 0.462 617071 1.000 0.364 
Overlap in legal specialty with officemates 2746500 0.612 0.243 13857 0.619 0.234 2732643 0.612 0.243 617071 N/A 0.000 
Male first name 2746500 0.741 0.438 13857 0.772 0.419 2732643 0.741 0.438 617071 0.752 0.432 
Female first name 2746500 0.209 0.406 13857 0.181 0.385 2732643 0.209 0.406 617071 0.197 0.398 
Peer rating: A 2746500 0.356 0.479 13857 0.363 0.481 2732643 0.356 0.479 617071 0.199 0.399 
Peer rating: B 2746500 0.179 0.383 13857 0.205 0.404 2732643 0.179 0.383 617071 0.278 0.448 
Peer rating: C 2746500 0.018 0.133 13857 0.027 0.161 2732643 0.018 0.133 617071 0.053 0.223 
Law school rank 1-10 2746500 0.123 0.329 13857 0.075 0.264 2732643 0.123 0.329 617071 0.062 0.241 
Law school rank 11-20 2746500 0.097 0.296 13857 0.082 0.275 2732643 0.097 0.296 617071 0.064 0.244 
Law school rank 21-30 2746500 0.060 0.238 13857 0.044 0.205 2732643 0.061 0.239 617071 0.042 0.200 
Law school rank 31-40 2746500 0.091 0.287 13857 0.091 0.288 2732643 0.091 0.287 617071 0.076 0.265 
Law school rank 41-50 2746500 0.054 0.225 13857 0.064 0.245 2732643 0.054 0.225 617071 0.057 0.231 
Law school unranked 2746500 0.575 0.494 13857 0.643 0.479 2732643 0.575 0.494 617071 0.700 0.458 
Law school rank (1-50, continuous) 1167285 21.757 13.847 4947 24.914 13.898 1162338 21.743 13.845 185213 25.321 13.854 
Law school honor society 2746500 0.075 0.263 13857 0.056 0.230 2732643 0.075 0.264 617071 0.019 0.138 
Law review editorial position 2746500 0.155 0.362 13857 0.142 0.349 2732643 0.155 0.362 617071 0.057 0.232 
Moot court participant 2746500 0.064 0.245 13857 0.091 0.287 2732643 0.064 0.245 617071 0.036 0.186 
Phi Beta Kappa 2746500 0.072 0.258 13857 0.052 0.223 2732643 0.072 0.259 617071 0.026 0.158 
Clerked for judge 2746500 0.102 0.302 13857 0.100 0.300 2732643 0.102 0.302 617071 0.045 0.206 
Firm size (# attorneys) 2746500 170.26 288.72 13857 105.819 235.670 2732643 170.594 288.936 617071 1.000 0.000 
Office as % of total firm size 2746500 0.700 0.328 13857 0.747 0.313 2732643 0.700 0.328 617071 1.000 0.000 
Growth in firm headcount 2746500 8.252 38.849 13857 4.380 30.594 2732643 8.271 38.886 497949 -0.040 0.717 
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Firm is acquired 2746500 0.004 0.062 13857 0.008 0.090 2732643 0.004 0.062 617071 0.000 0.104 
Rival closures, solo practitioners 2746500 11.287 14.973 13857 11.646 15.253 2732643 11.286 14.972 617071 11.880 16.138 
Rival closures, firm size>1 2746500 6.809 10.052 13857 6.139 9.194 2732643 6.812 10.056 617071 4.714 7.681 
# rival firms 2746500 658.70 919.83 13857 592.828 831.501 2732643 659.034 920.251 617071 551.47 875.08 
% of rival firms that are solo practices 2746500 0.297 0.163 13857 0.331 0.166 2732643 0.297 0.163 617071 0.413 0.163 
Rival partner dies unexpectedly, firm size>1 2746500 0.021 0.150 13857 0.021 0.146 2732643 0.021 0.150 617071 0.013 0.113 
Level of analysis is the attorney-year.  See online appendix for practice area information. Solo practitioners are not included in the estimation sample. 
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Table 2: Partner attorneys who suffer unexpected deaths 
 (1)     (2)     
 Solo practitioners Firm size>1 
 n Mean StDev Min Max n Mean StDev Min Max 
Cause of death: heart attack 61 0.07 0.25 0 1 264 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Cause of death: accident 61 0.23 0.42 0 1 264 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Cause of death: sudden illness 61 0.07 0.25 0 1 264 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Cause of death: other sudden cause 61 0.64 0.48 0 1 264 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Attorney age 61 54.15 7.52 32 65 264 52.73 7.59 33 64 
Male first name 61 0.87 0.34 0 1 264 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Female first name 61 0.11 0.32 0 1 264 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Peer rating: A 61 0.23 0.42 0 1 264 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Years since law school graduation 61 26.48 9.25 5 40 264 25.99 8.17 5 40 
Graduated from top 10 law school 61 0.04 0.22 0 1 264 0.12 0.38 0 1 
Firm size (# attorneys) 61 1.00 0.00 1 1 264 127.55 188.03 2 503 
Observations 61     264     
Summary statistics are for year prior to death 
 
Table 3:  Cross Sectional Correlations 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Founds new firm 1.00 
              2 Rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly 0.01 1.00 
             3 Associate -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
            4 % of partners in practice area from attorney's law 
school 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 1.00 
           5 Associate-partner ratio in practice area -0.01 -0.01 0.44 -0.08 1.00 
          6 Attorney age 0.00 0.02 -0.64 0.04 -0.34 1.00 
         7 Years since law school graduation 0.00 0.03 -0.65 0.02 -0.34 0.97 1.00 
        8 Tenure with firm 0.00 0.05 -0.42 0.04 -0.23 0.46 0.47 1.00 
       9 Tenure with firm is left-censored -0.01 -0.01 -0.45 0.07 -0.22 0.44 0.45 0.49 1.00 
      10 Partner 0.00 0.02 -0.83 0.06 -0.41 0.51 0.52 0.40 0.46 1.00 
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11 Overlap in legal specialty with officemates 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 1.00 
    12 Male first name 0.00 0.01 -0.24 0.01 -0.12 0.27 0.28 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.02 1.00 
   13 Female first name 0.00 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.12 -0.26 -0.28 -0.11 -0.16 -0.23 -0.02 -0.87 1.00 
  14 Peer rating: A 0.01 0.02 -0.45 0.03 -0.19 0.59 0.61 0.29 0.36 0.41 -0.03 0.20 -0.20 1.00 
 15 Law school rank 1-10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.15 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.05 1.00 
16 Law school rank (1-50) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.24 -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.74 
17 Law school honor society 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.06 
18 Law review editorial position 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 
19 Moot court participant 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 
20 Phi Beta Kappa 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.19 
21 Clerked for judge 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 
22 Firm size (# attorneys) -0.02 0.01 0.12 -0.14 0.19 -0.14 -0.14 -0.03 -0.16 -0.15 -0.13 -0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.17 
23 Office as % of total firm size 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 0.14 -0.15 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.13 
24 Growth in firm headcount -0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.07 
25 Firm is acquired 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
26 # rival firms -0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.13 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.13 -0.08 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.18 
27 % of rival firms that are solo practices 0.01 0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.10 0.10 0.41 -0.18 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 
28 Rival closures, solo practitioners 0.00 0.07 0.02 -0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.18 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.13 
29 Rival closures, firm size>1 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.16 0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.13 
30 Rival partner dies unexpectedly, firm size>1 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
  
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
16 Law school rank (1-50) 1.00 
              17 Law school honor society 0.06 1.00 
             18 Law review editorial position 0.02 0.26 1.00 
            19 Moot court participant 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 
           20 Phi Beta Kappa -0.20 0.07 0.06 0.00 1.00 
          21 Clerked for judge -0.08 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.07 1.00 
         22 Firm size (# attorneys) -0.22 0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.05 1.00 
        23 Office as % of total firm size 0.17 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.71 1.00 
       24 Growth in firm headcount -0.09 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.43 -0.27 1.00 
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25 Firm is acquired -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 1.00 
     26 # rival firms -0.23 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.26 -0.17 0.09 0.00 1.00 
    27 % of rival firms that are solo practices 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.30 1.00 
   28 Rival closures, solo practitioners -0.18 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.14 -0.10 0.06 0.01 0.69 0.26 1.00 
  29 Rival closures, firm size>1 -0.18 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.49 -0.13 0.74 1.00 
 30 Rival partner dies unexpectedly, firm size>1 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.01 1.00 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
61 
Table 4:  Unconditional comparison of founding rates 
 
 
Value N observations 




Rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly 0 2,720,303 0.005 
 
 
Rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly 1 26,197 0.009 T-test diff p-value  
 
  Difference 0.004 10.10 .000 
 
Table 5: DV: Founds a new firm. Linear probability models (Models 1-6) 













H1: Rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly 0.00445 0.00193 0.00305 -0.00001 0.00209 0.00294 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.996) (0.419) (0.001) 
H2a:Rival solo practitioner dies* % of partners 
in practice area from attorney's law school 
  
-0.00704  -0.01521 -0.00712 
   (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
H2b:Rival solo practitioner dies*Assoc-part. 
ratio    0.00385 0.00377  
    (0.019) (0.021)  
% of partners in prac. area from law school  -0.00083 -0.00078 -0.00144 -0.00136 -0.00177 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) 
Associate-partner ratio in practice area  -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00023 0.00023 0.00098 
  (0.868) (0.868) (0.041) (0.041) (0.000) 
Associate  -0.00319 -0.00319   -0.00241 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) 
Attorney age  0.00006 0.00006 0.00019 0.00019 0.00120 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years since law school graduation  -0.00016 -0.00016 0.00007 0.00007  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.101) (0.100)  
Tenure with firm  -0.00006 -0.00006 0.00040 0.00040 -0.00020 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) 
Tenure with firm is left-censored  -0.00080 -0.00080 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.02742 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.981) (0.984) (0.000) 
Partner  -0.00254 -0.00254   -0.00721 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Overlap in legal specialty with officemates  -0.00285 -0.00285 -0.00256 -0.00256 -0.00506 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male first name  0.00102 0.00102 0.00105 0.00105  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)  
Female first name  -0.00013 -0.00014 -0.00092 -0.00092  
  (0.509) (0.508) (0.008) (0.008)  
Peer rating: A  0.00219 0.00219   0.00198 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Peer rating: B  0.00167 0.00167   0.00228 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Peer rating: C  0.00225 0.00225   0.00160 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.046) 
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Law school rank 1-10  -0.00051 -0.00052 -0.00072 -0.00072  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006)  
Law school rank 11-20  -0.00017 -0.00017 -0.00019 -0.00019  
  (0.249) (0.246) (0.484) (0.481)  
Law school rank 21-30  -0.00098 -0.00098 -0.00074 -0.00074  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.029)  
Law school rank 31-40  0.00003 0.00003 -0.00027 -0.00027  
  (0.869) (0.878) (0.334) (0.326)  
Law school rank 41-50  -0.00044 -0.00043 -0.00081 -0.00081  
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.134) (0.137)  
Law school honor society  -0.00048 -0.00048 -0.00078 -0.00078  
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.030) (0.029)  
Law review editorial position  -0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00039 -0.00039  
  (0.481) (0.480) (0.101) (0.102)  
Moot court participant  0.00112 0.00112 0.00128 0.00129  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)  
Phi Beta Kappa  -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00004 -0.00004  
  (0.672) (0.672) (0.899) (0.893)  
Clerked for judge  0.00032 0.00032 0.00001 0.00001  
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.964) (0.970)  
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)  -0.00218 -0.00220 -0.00346 -0.00348 0.00283 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Office as % of total firm size  0.00047 0.00047 0.00024 0.00024 -0.01259 
  (0.566) (0.563) (0.870) (0.868) (0.000) 
Growth in firm headcount  0.00169 0.00170 0.00728 0.00730 -0.00243 
  (0.098) (0.096) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) 
Firm is acquired  0.00674 0.00673 -0.00019 -0.00020 0.00082 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.893) (0.885) (0.597) 
# rival firms, 1000s  -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00073 -0.00073 0.00041 
  (0.895) (0.880) (0.000) (0.000) (0.070) 
% of rival firms that are solo practices  0.00042 0.00041 0.00369 0.00366 0.00133 
  (0.623) (0.631) (0.070) (0.072) (0.260) 
Rival closures, solo practitioners  0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001 
  (0.105) (0.107) (0.052) (0.054) (0.086) 
Rival closures, firm size>1, 1000s  0.00551 0.00577 -0.00502 -0.00452 0.01257 
  (0.617) (0.597) (0.797) (0.816) (0.125) 
Rival partner dies unexpectedly, firm size>1  0.00050 0.00050 -0.00020 -0.00019 0.00015 
  (0.268) (0.267) (0.799) (0.806) (0.772) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Fixed effect None Office Office Office Office Attorney 
Legal specialty dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N atty-year obs 2746500 2746500 2746500 658956 658956 2746500 
R-sq 0.000 0.049 0.049 0.088 0.088 0.230 
Exact p-values in parentheses. Models use robust standard errors clustered on city (i.e. CBSA) 
Rivals share the same city and legal specialty as the focal attorney 
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Table 6: Robustness tests:  Interactions with attorney quality measures, conflicts of interest 
















Rival solo practitioner dies unexpectedly 0.00218 0.00002 0.00420 0.00121 0.00137 0.00040  
 (0.008) (0.992) (0.035) (0.200) (0.107) (0.800)  
Law school rank 1-10*Rival solo dies -0.00197       
 (0.177)       
Law school ranking*Rival solo dies   0.00006      
  (0.460)      
Law school honor society*Rival solo dies    -0.00113     
   (0.838)     
Peer rating: A* Rival solo dies    -0.00003    
    (0.983)    
Peer rating: A, B, or C * Rival solo dies     -0.00025   
     (0.846)   
Overlap in legal specialty with officemates *Rival solo dies      0.00235  
      (0.339)  
Shares one prac. area  w/deceaseda       0.0017 
       (0.033) 
Shares more than one prac. area  w/deceaseda       0.0031 
       (0.093) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  
Fixed effect unit Office Office Office Office Office Office  
Legal specialty dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N atty-year obs 2746500 1167285 658956 1896256 1896256 2746500  
R-sq 0.049 0.084 0.088 0.068 0.068 0.049  
Exact p-values in parentheses. Models use robust standard errors clustered on city (i.e. CBSA) 
Rivals share the same city and legal specialty as the focal attorney. 
aA Wald test comparing these coefficients has a test statistic of 1.56 and a p-value of .20.
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Table 7:  Summary of sensitivity analyses 
                                                            
10 Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 appear in the online appendix. 







Deaths increase mortality salience, 
leading to founding as attorneys re-
examine their lives 
Examine effect of deaths of non-
solo practitioners 
Deaths of non-solo 
practitioners do not increase 
foundings. 
Table 5, Model 2 
Results driven by friends of deceased 
who inherit the legal practice 
Examine demographic overlap 
between treated and deceased 
Treatment effect does not 




Results driven by lower quality 
attorneys 
Examine interactions with treatment 
and measures of attorney quality 
Interactions are 
insignificant 
Table 6, Models 
1-4 
  Use individual fixed effects Results are consistent Table 5, Model 6 
Results driven by conflicts of client 
interests 
Examine interaction between 
treatment and sharing of legal 
specialties with coworkers 
Interaction is insignificant Table 6, Model 5 
  
Results are spurious Examine performance of treated 
founders 
Treated founders survive 
longer than others, possibly 
from resource transfer 
Table B.3 
  
  Examine variation in legal specialty 
overlap between treated and 
deceased 
Treatment effect is larger 
for individuals who 
compete more intensely 
with deceased (p=.20) 
Table 6, Model 6 
  
  Examine transfer of resources from 
dead individuals to treated 
individuals 
13 treated founders use 
exact address or exact 





Deaths are not quasi-random Examine parallel trends assumption Results are consistent Figure 3 
Size cut offs for startup firms is 
arbitrary 
Examine other size cutoffs Results are consistent Table B.1, 
Models 1-4 
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Deaths treat many attorneys in same 
city 
Use block bootstrapped standard 
errors, sampling within city 
Results are consistent Table B.1, 
Model 5 
Foundings are dichotomous outcome Use logit, penalized logit Results are consistent Table B.1, 
Model 6 
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Figure 1:  Test of H2a:  How Treatment Effect Varies with Shared Law School Affiliations with Partner Attorneys 
in Attorney’s Practice Area. OLS Estimation. 
 
Note:  Model contains full set of controls reported in Table 5. Mean of the DV is .005. 
 






























    
% partners in prac. area from attorney's law school
H2a: Moderating effect of law school ties to law partners
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Ratio of associates to partners in prac. area
H2b: Moderating effect of competition for promotion
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Figure 3:  Time Trend of Treatment Effect, Linear Probability Estimation 
 
Note: Figure shows results of estimation of Equation1. Model contains full set of controls reported in Table 5. Baseline effect 































Years From Death of Rival Solo Practitioner
Year before/after Death of Solo Practitioner
95% CI.
Founds New Firm
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